Abortion Reform: History, Status, and Prognosis by Milman, Kathryn G.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 3
1970
Abortion Reform: History, Status, and Prognosis
Kathryn G. Milman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Kathryn G. Milman, Abortion Reform: History, Status, and Prognosis, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 521 (1970)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol21/iss3/6
1970]
NOTE
Abortion Reform: History, Status, and Prognosis
In the world today there are an estimated 30 million induced
abortions and 115 million live births, a ratio of one to four.
Countries with legalized abortion have sanctioned unchange-
able social custom. Countries with liberal abortion laws have
legitimized current medical practice. Countries with stringent
abortion laws have buried their heads in the sands of time.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is currently experiencing a surge of significant
endeavors by its individual jurisdictions to dig America out of the
sand.2 Recent judicial decisions, pending litigation, and mass media
1 Hall, Commentary, in ABORTION AND THE LAw 224, 234 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
Abortion is defined generally as the "expulsion or detachment of a pre-viable ovum."
F. TAUSSIG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED MEDICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS
21 (1936), cited in Note, Constitutional Aspects of Present Criminal Abortion Law, 3
VALPARAISO U.L REV. 102, 103 n.5 (1968). Early common law seemed to equate
viability with quickening and ruled that abortion was not a crime unless performed
after the fetus quickened, presumably between the 14th and 20th week of pregnancy
when the mother notices movement of the fetus within her. Modern sources, however,
define the viable fetus as one capable of living outside the womb, generally between
the 24th and 28th week. The viability criterion is considered superior to that of
quickening since the latter often depends upon subjective sensations of the mother.
See, e.g., Fisher, Criminal Abortion, in ABORTION IN .AMERICA 3 (H. Rosen ed. 1967);
E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VicriMs 11 (1965).
Most abortions are performed during the first trimester of pregnancy, i.e., within the
first 3 months, when, if properly done, they may be safer than childbirth. See, e.g.,
People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360-62, 458 P.2d 194, 200-01 (1969), cert. denied,
38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970); L LADER, ABORTION 4 (1966). During this
period, dilation and curettage, a 20-minute procedure, is a safe, routine medical technique
utilized to perform abortions by dilating the cervix and scraping out the contents of the
uterine lining. See, e.g., R. COOKE, A. HELLEGERS, R_ HOYT & H. RICHARDSON, THE
TERRIBLE CHOICE: THE ABORTION DILEMMA 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as TERRIBLE
CHOICE]; L LADER, supra at 18. After the first trimester, the growth of the fetus re-
quires more radical surgery. Fisher, supra at 8.
Abortions may be spontaneous or induced. A spontaneous abortion, usually called
a miscarriage, is the involuntary expulsion of a fetus before it is capable of living, often
because it dies in utero from abnormal development or maternal disease. See, e.g.,
Fisher, supra at 3-4. Until recently, miscarriages referred only to births of babies weigh-
ing less than 2 pounds, 3 ounces, or born within the first 27 weeks. But today because
about 10 percent of those babies survive, this distinction is no longer valid. See TER-
RIBLE CHOICE, supra at 38. The legal definition of viability at 28 weeks still controls,
however, even though it dashes with modem medical facts and increases the confusion.
See L. LADER, supra at 178-79 n.3.
Induced abortions are either therapeutic or criminal. Therapeutic abortions are
legally sanctioned by statute and performed by licensed physicians to protect the
mother's life or health. Fisher, supra at 4-5. Criminal abortions are all those not con-
sidered spontaneous or therapeutic, performed either by the mother herself or by some
third person, including physicians operating outside the law. Id. at 5. For a descrip-
tion of such criminal abortion techniques, see E. SCHUR, supra at 28-29.
2 Some states have enacted liberalized abortion laws. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
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publicity have given new impetus to the adversaries of outmoded
antiabortion legislation. To many, the ultimate goal is the demise of
all abortion regulation. Such legislation originated at a time when
social and economic conditions demanded rapid population growth
to replenish losses sustained through war and to provide manpower
for a swiftly growing America.3 Medical advancement was dwarfed
by infections that made almost any surgery a reliable harbinger of
death.4 Moreover, the security of an incubating country composed
of myriad and unique nationalities demanded strict adherence to the
highest traditional religious and ethical ideals.
Modern conditions, however, have occasioned a serious reexami-
nation of the problems generated by abortion and its statutory regu-
lation. Today one of the most pressing socio-economic issues is
overpopulation.5 The advancement of medical technology since the
1800's insures that a properly performed abortion is safer than child-
birth.6 The increasing secularization of American society renders it
much less susceptible to the majority's attempts to impose laws pred-
304 (Supp. 1969); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (West Supp. 1969); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 (Perm. Supp. 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9925(a) (1969
Rev.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1, -3 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1
(1969); ch. 684, § 17, [1969] Ore. Sess. Laws. For a general summary of state abor-
tion laws, see Sands, The Theraputic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 285, 310-12 (1966).
3 L. LADER, supra note 1, at 89. In the United States, abortion was widely accepted,
in practice at least, until the Civil War. Id. at 85.
4 New York hospital records of the 1820's revealed that a woman had a 15 per-
cent greater chance of surviving childbirth than of surviving an abortion. Greenhouse,
Constitutional Question: Is There a Right to Abortion?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1970, § 6
(Magazine), at 88. It was not until 1867 that Lister's first contributions to antiseptic
surgery were made public, and not until much later that their use was understood and
widely accepted. It was even later, in the 1940's, before antibiotics were developed.
Understandably, therefore, consideration for the woman's health was often used to jus-
tify curtailment of her right to an abortion, especially when even a necessary abortion
created a greater risk of death than childbirth. People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360,
458 P.2d 194, 200 (1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970).
5 In Eastern Europe and Russia it was recognized as early as the 1920's that popula-
tion control was essential for national prosperity. Today, abortion is the prevailing
birth control device employed in these countries. This may, in part, be the result of
ambivalent attitudes toward contraception which prevailed during the early half of
this century. That picture, however, is changing as more use is being made of modem
contraceptive devices. L LADER, supra note 1, at 120-31. In Japan, where abortion at
the woman's request is permitted, the birth rate had declined from 34.3 per 1,000 in
1947, to 16.9 by 1961, where it generally remains. Although primary reliance was
placed upon abortions in the 1950's, in recent years contraceptive methods have be-
come more popular in Japan. Id. at 132-36. Abortions performed in Russia by compe-
tent physicians under sanitary conditions have a mortality rate of .01 percent MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment 1(3) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). For one view on
abortion as a control device for population overgrowth, see L. LADER, supra note 1, at
125-43.
6 See notes 1, 4 supra.
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icated upon outmoded theological and moral scruples.7 Increased
public awareness of the dangers of certain diseases contracted in
early pregnancy and of the use of certain drugs during pregnancy
has led many conscientious physicians and parents to actively rebel
against laws compelling them to deliver and provide for a possibly
defective or stillborn child.8 In addition, those countries that have
sanctioned abortion on demand have been rewarded with conse-
quent alleviation of dire overpopulation and its attendant welfare
problems.'
The stagnation of American abortion laws creates an even more
acute situation, evidenced by the incidence with which these regu-
lations are flagrantly violated. Statistics necessarily vary consider-
ably, but estimates reveal three of every 10 conceptions in the
United States fail to produce a viable fetus or to reach term, One
estimate is that annually there are approximately 1.3 million abor-
tions in America."0 About two-thirds of these are spontaneous abor-
tions." The extent of therapeutic abortions ranges from one cal-
culation of 18,000 per year to another of from 1 to 5 percent of all
7See Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine,
11 STAN. L. REv. 417, 448 (1959); Sands, supra note 2, at 297. That antiabortion
laws are deeply imbued with religious dogma is well supported. Yet, little considera-
tion has been given to the fact that these laws may violate the first amendment's require-
ment of separation of church and state. But see TERRIBLE CHoIcE, supra note 1, at 96.
8 Although opponents aver that the degree of medical speculation involved in pre-
dicting the outcome of such a pregnancy is far too great to sustain its validity, data indi-
cate that certain occurrences during pregnancy notoriously produce a relatively high
percentage of serious fetal defects. Most notable is german measles where there is a
60 percent risk of a defective child if the mother contracts the disease in the first few
weeks after conception, and a 20 percent risk for the remainder of the first trimester,
with the risk dropping to below 10 percent after 12 weeks. Ryan, Humane Abortion
Laws and the Health Needs of Society, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 60, 65-67 (D.
Smith ed. 1967); Note, The California Therapeutic 'Abortion Act: An Analysis, 19
HASTINGS LJ. 242, 248 (1967). The recent Thalidomide tragedy has left its indelible
mark on the minds of women and has caused many to fear even the safety of the com-
mon aspirin. Other fetal defects are known to have resulted from irradiation of the
pelvic region during early pregnancy; from severe genetic defects in one or both parents,
including unchecked Rh incompatability; and possibly even from the use of LSD and
similar hallucinogenic drugs. For a comprehensive summary of medical indicia for
therapeutic abortion, see Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States,
in ABORTION AND THE LAW 37, 41-49 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
All states with reformed abortion laws, with the exception of California, have in-
corporated a eugenic provision permitting abortions where there is substantial risk
that the child would be born with severe mental or physical defects. See Note, supra
at 248.
9 See note 5 supra.
10 Fisher, supra note 1, at 3. Alternatively, the MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11,
Comment 1(1) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), cites annual estimates of abortion from
330,000 to two million, of which anywhere from 30 to 70 percent are illegal.
1 Fisher, supra note 1, at 3.
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abortions.12 The aggregate of criminal abortions is nearly impos-
sible to reliably gauge. The only available figures are derived from
puerperal deaths and extend, in California, from between 5,000 and
10,000 annually (or one-third of all maternal deaths) to nearly one-
half of all such deaths in New York City.13 A 1951 study based on
a minimum of one million annual abortions claimed 330,000 crimi-
nal abortions. 14  The latter also includes those which are self-in-
duced. Several studies of all abortions among mixed racial and
economic backgrounds disclosed that self-induced abortions account
for between 25 and 30 percent of the total.'"
The picture of considerable public resistance to and disapproba-
tion of present abortion restrictions seems clear. Although condi-
tions which spawned the original abortion legislation have changed
significantly, legislative response has been tormentingly slow. To
some degree, a few states have met the need for reform in recent
years with progressive therapeutic abortion statutes, yet many state
abortion statutes have remained virtually unchanged since the mid-
1800's. But while the legislators have stubbornly clung to tradition,
modern judicial response to the problem portends further reform,
and, in fact, may suggest the imminent demise of all statutory abor-
tion regulation.
This Note will endeavor to trace the historical conditions that
precipitated abortion restrictions; to scrutinize the legislative efforts
to render the laws more responsive to modern conditions; to exam-
ine the judicial response to this legislation; and, finally, to project,
in light of the most recent developments, the future course of abor-
tion proscriptions.
II. SOCIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ATTITUDES
A. Historical Development
The inception of abortion may be traced to the earliest of civi-
lizations.'8 Recorded history reveals that the practice of abortion,
121d. at 4.
13 L. LADER, supra note 1, at 3.
14 E. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 25.
15 L. LADER, supra note 1, at 73.
16 See, e.g., Niswander, supra note 8, at 38-40; Devereaux, A Typological Study of
Abortion in 350 Primitive, Ancient and Pre-Industrial Societies, in ABORTION IN
AMERICA 97-152 (H. Rosen ed. 1967). One source dates the earliest known record of
abortion 3,000 years before Christ in the royal archives of China. In 1728 B.C., the
Code of the Babylonian King, Hammurabi, proscribed abortion but limited penalties to
compensatory damages when assault on a pregnant woman caused a miscarriage. L.
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rarely condemned by ancient peoples, was probably universal. 7  The
early Greek and Roman civilizations regarded abortion as a sound
policy for population control, as did many primitive tribes."8
About A.D. 65, the first known Christian writings began to con-
flict with these early Greek and Roman customs by assailing as in-
fanticide the act of abortion. 9 As articulated by early Christianity
and the Roman Catholic Church, the reasoning lay within two pre-
cepts: (1) The doctrine of "original sin" suggested that an un-
baptized human who dies will never attain complete salvation; (2)
that the merging of soul and body created a human being.20 Within
this latter precept lies the root of modern-day controversy. Aris-
totelian, 2' Augustinian,2 2 and Thomistic23 views on the development
of a soul were a great influence on the doctrines of the Catholic
Church, and even today are followed by some theologians.24 How-
LADER, supra note 1, at 75. For an excellent study of the history of abortion laws, see
B. DICKEmNS, ABORTION AND THE LAW 11-28 (1966).
17 L. LADER, supra note 1, at 75.
18 Id. at 76. A notable exception is the Hippocratic Oath which is thought to be
the only early Greek source to condemn abortion. Id.
Early Roman law regarded abortion as an offense against the parents, not against
the potential child, and, therefore, saw no misdeed if the parents consented. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment 1(6) n.12 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). However, the
liberal Roman tolerance of abortion fell to ruin around 200 B.C., when women demanded
emancipation from the absolute control exercised by their husbands to condemn or
order abortion, and they began to use abortion for "personal vanity and social ambi-
tion." L LADER, supra note 1, at 76-77. Between 18 B.C. and A.D. 211, unsuccessful
attempts were made to check the incidence of abortion through the granting of tax
benefits and political favors for additional children, and later by exiling wives who had
undergone abortion. Id. at 77.
19 Id.
20 Sands, supra note 2, at 293-94. This argument has diminished today in favor of
Pope Pius' 1930 encyclical, Casi Connubi, condemning any deliberate interference
with the unborn child as "an act against nature." L LADER, supra note 1, at 80.
21 Aristotle theorized that the soul developed in three stages, beginning with the
vegetable soul at conception, followed by the animal soul, and finally, the rational soul.
Moreover, in the days when each city-state prescribed the number of children each
couple could have, Aristotle preached that if a married woman already had her quota of
offspring, any subsequent pregnancy should be aborted before she felt life. Gutt-
macher, The Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortions, in ABORTION IN AMERICA 175
(H. Rosen ed. 1967). Plato had recommended compulsory abortion for all women who
conceived after the age of 40. Id. at 175-76.
2 The influence of the Catholic mentor, Saint Augustine, was felt in Canon Law
where a distinction was drawn between the embryo formatus which is endowed with a
soul, and the embryo informatus. Destruction of the former was punishable by death,
whereas punishment for destruction of the latter was limited to a fine. B. DICKENS,
supra note 16, at 15-16.
23 Saint Thomas Aquinas asserted that the soul does not exist until the 7th week of
pregnancy. Kumer, Due Process of Abortion, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17 n.82 (1968).
24 Many contemporary theologians follow the view of Saint Thomas Aquinas that
the soul exists after the 7th week of pregnancy. Id.
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 521
ever, it was not until 1869 that the Catholic Church under the proc-
lamation of Pope Pius IX adopted its current position that the soul
enters a fetus at conception. 5
Other early religious groups varied their opposition to abortion
by relying on biblical commands26 or on needs of population con-
trol.17  Present attitudes of the Jewish and Protestant faiths are
not readily codified because of the lack of a central religious au-
thority such as is found in Rome, but with varying degrees of strict-
ness and liberality there remains a central theme - that a fetal life
should not be taken needlessly.28 There is emphasis on the sanctity
of human life; however, a priority is placed on the mother's life over
that of the unborn child. 9 Other religious groups place little or no
emphasis on the question of a soul,30 and indeed may not even con-
sider abortion a religious problem, but rather treat it as a social
problem."'
Dissatisfaction with such a background of diverse philosophies
and theological views led to the establishment of an English common
law designed to create uniformity of treatment.
B. Legislative Response
1. Early English Law.- The early English common law did not
prohibit abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. It was only
after quickening that control of abortion was attempted and even
2 5By abandoning all distinctions in fetal development, the Catholic Church effec-
tively prohibited abortion at any time. L. LADER, supra note 1, at 79.
Church proscriptions of abortion were reinforced by two other dominant Catholic
attitudes: (1) That sexual intercourse, even in marriage, is intrinsically evil, and should
not be accompanied by pleasure; and (2) that the only basis for intercourse is procrea-
tion of offspring. Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; Therapeutic
Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 647, 662 (1966).
2 6 Judeo-Christian sects found support in the Biblical mandate "Be fruitful, and
multiply." Genesis 1:28.
27 Several writers contend that the early Hebrews and Christians evidenced an his-
torical pattern of varying the severity of their abortion restrictions according to the
demands for an increased population to engage in war, or to propagandize monotheism.
Breitenecker & Breitenecker, Abortion in the German-Speaking Countries of Europe, in
ABORTION AND THE LAW 206 (D. Smith ed. 1967); 1. DICKENS, supra note 16, at
20-28.
28 See generally L. LADER, supra note 1, at 94-102. For an expanded discussion
of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish attitudes toward abortion, see Curran, Religious
Implications, in ABORTION IN AMERICA 153-74 (H. Rosen ed. 1967).
2 9 L. LADER, supra note 1, at 94-100.
30 The Japanese Shinto faith considers that a child is a human being only after it
has seen daylight. The Islamic theology indicates that a fetus must exist for 150 days
before life begins. Id. at 94.
31 Neither the Buddhist nor Hindu scriptures prohibit abortion, and the practitioners
of these faiths view the efficacy of abortion as merely a societal consideration. Id.
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then abortion was considered merely to be a misdemeanor. Adjudi-
cation of these offenses was generally left to the Ecclesiastical
courtsY2  However, influenced by Thomas Malthus' theory that the
population would rapidly increase beyond the supply of food and
necessities, England, whose number had increased 25 percent in the
preceding 30 years, was quicdy becoming aware of the problems of
overpopulation and the extreme poverty of the working class."3 To
some extent this concern was overshadowed by the need for man-
power for England's booming industrialization and for the Napole-
onic campaigns, both of which were impeded by the ravages of un-
controllable disease and infanticide.3 4 Nevertheless, in 1803, dis-
tressed with the number of abortions being performed and left un-
punished, Lord Ellenborough gave abortion its initial statutory basis
and, for the first time, declared abortion before quickening a
felony.35 This early statutory prohibition maintained the pre-
and post-quickening distinction, however, by providing the death
penalty for abortions performed after quickening and for a lesser
punishment for abortions in the early stages of pregnancy."6
Lord Landsdowne's Act of 1828 repealed the 1803 Act, but
added little more than the proscription of abortion by instruments
or any other means.3 7 This was followed in 1837 by the Offenses
Against The Person Act, which abandoned the differentiation be-
tween pre- and post-quickening.38 The latter was amended in 1861
to include a provision for indicting the woman as an accessory before
the fact to any abortion committed upon her and to any operation
performed on her with the intent to incur an abortion, whether she
was pregnant or not.39
Thus, the early English laws placed emphasis on the life of the
child as a potential addition to the population structure.
2. Early American Law.-- The early American law incorpo-
rated the English common law to a great extent, not recognizing
abortion as a criminal offense until after quickening, and then only
32 B. DIcKENs, supra note 16, at 23.
33 L. LADER, supra note 1, at 83.
34 Id.
35 B. DICKENS, supra note 16, at 23-24.
36 Id.; L. LADER, supra note 1, at 84.
37 B. DICKENS, supra note 16, at 25.
28 Use of the phrase "quick with child" in former acts lent some ambiguity to legis-
lative intent in this area. Aside from its use as a means of distinguishing a lesser offense
if the fetus had not quickened, the phrase could have been interpreted merely as neces-
sitating pregnancy as an element of the crime. Id. at 27.
39 Id. at 29. For a discussion of the judicial interpretation of this Act, see id. at 29-38.
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as a misdemeanor.4 ° Nevertheless, abortions were overtly adver-
tised and performed at least until the Civil War, and because of lack
of enforcement attempts to legislate against abortion met with little
success. 4 It was not until the middle of the 19th century that
antiabortion laws, many of which still remain unchanged, were
passed and enforced.42
Several reasons are posited for the rise of these laws in England
and the United States. Some theorize it was part of a general Vic-
torian trend to legislate moral behavior.43 In America especially,
the Puritanical preoccupation with sin demanded that the unmarried
pregnant girl be punished by displaying her transgression to the
world.44  Others postulate that the laws followed a legislative dis-
covery that the quickening distinction was at best artificial and arbi-
trary.45 Ignoring the concept of when the soul enters the fetus,
most legislatures sought to proscribe abortion on the rationale that
it was a "violation of 'the mysteries of nature' which would deny
potential human beings to the destined expansion of America. ' '41
A third, and primary, reason for these early abortion laws probably
was the legislative recognition of abortion as extremely dangerous.47
The early American statutes were exceedingly rigid in that they
prohibited -abortion for any reason. It was not until 1828 that the
first law was enacted which legalized some abortions. In that year,
New York passed legislation which entrusted to the medical profes-
sion the decision of whether to allow an abortion to save the
mother's life.48  Ohio followed in 1834, Missouri and Indiana in
4 0 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 263 (1845); State v. Mur-
phy, 27 N.J.L. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1858). See also Leavy & Kummer, supra note 25, at 669.
41 L LADER, supra note 1, at 85-86. The first American abortion statute was passed
in Connecticut in 1821, but it was not until 1860 that abortion before quickening was
finally outlawed. Id. at 86.
42 St. John-Stevas, The Right to Life - The Abortion Dilemma, 4 GONZAGA L
REV. 1 (1968); TERRIBLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 48-49.
43 TERRIBLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 48.
44 L. LADER, supra note 1, at 89. In the Puritan mind, antiabortion laws were suc-
cessfully used to instill a fear of pregnancy among the unmarried as a means of enforcing
morality. The Puritan crusade was further buttressed by Anthony Comstock, Secretary
of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, and the passage of the Comstock
Bill, "An Act for the Suppression of Trade in and Circulation of Obscene Literature and
Articles of Immoral Use," giving him, as special agent for the Post Office Department,
virtually unlimited authority to rid America of vice. Id. at 90-91.
45 St. John-Stevas, supra note 42, at 1; TERRIBLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 48.
46 L. LADER, supra note 1, at 88.
47 St. John-Stevas, supra note 42, at 1; TERRIBLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 49.
48 The New York statute was patterned after England's first abortion law with one
important qualification: abortions would be legal when it was "necessary to preserve
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1835, until now every state provides for some form of legal abor-
tion.49 During this formative period, the legislative sentiment seems
to have shifted from the early English preoccupation with the life
of the child to a concern for the life of the mother. Thus, the
rationale for the passage of abortion legislation increasingly em-
phasized that because of its inherent danger to the life of the mother,
abortion should not be condoned unless it could be shown that it
would save the mother's life.
3. A Prdcis of Modern Legislation.- The typical pre-1967
"therapeutic" abortion law was, in reality, similarly inflexible:
A person who provides, supplies, or administers to a pregnant
woman, or procures such woman to take any medicine, drugs, or
substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other means what-
ever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman,
unless it is necessary to save her life, shall be punished by impris-
onment in the state prison for not less than two years nor more
than five years.50
The predominant weakness in this type of law is that it permits
abortion only in one instance - when to deny one would cause
the mother to die. By reducing the choice to life or death, these
statutes fail to consider that without an abortion serious or perma-
nent injury short of death may be suffered. 1 In addition, by focus-
ing only upon potential damage to the mother's life, such laws in-
crease the possibility that defective children will be born to women
carrying adverse genetically inherited factors or who have been ex-
posed to chromosome-damaging drugs or radiation. Moreover, by
preventing abortion where conception occurs because of rape or in-
cest, and by failing to consider the plight of a woman medically un-
able to successfully use contraceptives, the statutes arguably contrib-
ute indirectly to the breeding of numerous unwanted children for
already badly congested ghettos and overburdened orphanages and
welfare agencies. Finally, it can be argued that these laws, osten-
sibly promulgated on the ethics of protecting the woman's life, in
reality promote more deaths because they have the effect of creating
a thriving medium of illicit abortions for the desperate woman who
can not meet the standard required for a legal abortion.52
a. The ALI Model Abortion Act.- In response to such glaring
the life of such mother, or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for
such purpose." L I.ADER, supra note 1, at 87.
491d. at 88.
50 Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956).
51 See Ryan, supra note 8, at 68-69.
52 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment 1, at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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weaknesses, two types of progressive legislation have been designed
- the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code53 and the state
therapeutic abortion acts. In a tentative draft drawn up in 19 59 5
and approved in 1962, the ALI Model Penal Code first dealt with
the subject of abortion reform for the purpose of providing a blue-
print for revision of abortion legislation in the states. To date, no
state has adopted all of the provisions of the Model Act, and only a
few states have incorporated some of the recommendations.55
The model statute initially provides that one who willfully and
without justification aborts a pregnant woman during the first 26
weeks commits a felony of the third degree. Beyond the 26th week,
the abortionist has commited a felony of the second degree.5" Ap-
parently, the variation in the degree of the crime corresponds to the
suggested viability distinction, the 26th week being designated as
the time when the fetus is capable of living independently of its
mother and, thus, more deserving of the law's protection . 7
A second provision permits a licensed physician to justifiably
terminate a pregnancy if (1) he believes there is a substantial risk
that the mother's physical or mental health would severely deterio-
rate if pregnancy were to continue, or (2) that the child would be
born seriously crippled in mind or body, or (3) that the pregnancy
was the result of forcible rape or of incest.58 The existence of any
one or more of these conditions must be certified in writing by two
physicians (one of whom may perform the abortion) and be filed,
prior to the abortion, in the place where the abortion will be per-
formed - either a licensed hospital or such other place as the law
designates.59 Such ascribed justification is considered an affirma-
tive defense to any subsequent prosecution. 60
53 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), formerly § 207.11
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
54 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
55 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (Supp. 1969); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25951 (West Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 (Perm. Cum. Supp.
1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9925 (a) (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1, -3
(Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969).
5 6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11(1) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The Model Code
provides that a third-degree felony is also committed if the abortionist attempts an
abortion on a woman he knows is not pregnant or on a woman for whom the existence
of such pregnancy he recklessly neglects to determine. Id. § 207.11(4). It should be
noted that the language of the first subsection is not applicable to instances when early
delivery must be induced to save the fetus' life. Id. § 207.11, Comment 2, at 151 n.16.
57 Id. § 207.11, Comment 15, at 162.
58 Id. § 2 07.11(2)(a).
59 Id. § 207.11(2)(b).
60 Id. § 207.11(2). The prosecution has the burden of disproving, beyond a rea-
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By expanding the standard which must be met to obtain a legal
abortion from necessary for the preservation of the mother's life to
also include substantial risk to both physical and mental health, the
model statute implicitly recognizes that continuing a pregnancy may
cause physical injury short of death."' Furthermore, this new stan-
dard recognizes that the potential effect of an unwanted pregnancy
on the mental condition of the mother is an equally valid consider-
ation when deciding whether to abort a pregnancy. It is quite pos-
sible for pregnancies to generate suicidal proclivities. 2 The social
stigma of giving birth to a child which may be the result of incest or
rape is likely to increase the threat of suicide. In jurisdictions
which do not recognize such factors as justifications for an abor-
tion, psychiatrists frequently fabricate a psychiatric basis predicated
upon the adverse psychological effects of such situations, particu-
larly on the already unstable personality.63
A third area of advancement is that the Act sanctions the abor-
tion of a fetus that results from forcible rape or incestuous relation-
ships. While many state statutes have allowed abortions in such
instances, they often condition the abortion upon a finding, usually
by the Attorney General, that there is just cause to believe that the
rape had been forcible, or that the female bad not consented to the
incestuous affair. By eliminating such preconditions, the Model
Code emphasizes that justification for permitting abortions in the
case of rape or incest rests on a desire to prevent the corrosive ef-
fects that the birth of a child would have on the mother's mental
posture, rather than being founded upon the old theory that no den-
sonable doubt, the physician's certified honest belief that abortion is justified. Id.,
Comment 7, at 156-57.
61 See, e.g., Comment, An Analysis of the Proposed Changes to the Ohio Abortion
Statute, 37 U. CN. L. REv. 340, 347-48 (1968). The additional word "health" ac-
knowledges that most physicians equate life with health, and that life, meaning more
than immediate survival, depends upon both physical and mental health. Rosen, Psy-
chiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, in ABORTiON AND
THE LAW 72, 75 (D. Smith ed. 1967). See also Kutner, supra note 23, at 26, wherein
he states that the concept of health involves the individual as an integral part of his
total environment By stressing the individual's interaction within his social cosmos,
Kumer suggests that abortions should also be approved when justification is founded
upon factors other than mere physical or mental indicia.
62 The actual suicide rate among pregnant women is less than the statistical expecta-
tion for the population as a whole. Rosen, A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, in ABOR-
TON IN AMEmCA 299, 303-04 (H. Rosen ed. 1967).
6 3 See, e.g., Lidz, Reflections of a Psychiatrist, in ABORTION IN AMERICA 276-83
(H. Rosen ed. 1967). Suicide is probably the most popular psychiatric claim, particu-
larly since it could be utilized to satisfy the standard of "necessary to preserve the
mother's life." See People v. Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336
(1965).
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igrating consequence should be visited upon the innocent victim of
an antisocial act.64  Additionally, the Act stresses the undesirable
medical and social effects of an incestuous relationship. Not only
may close in-breeding result in a genetically defective child,6" but
also incestuous issue may not be legitimized through the marriage of
their parents,6 nor are they often welcome for adoption."
Today almost all state reform abortion acts permit abortion to
prevent the birth of a possibly defective child.68 The principal jus-
tification for abortion in such cases is that the birth of such a child
would cause grave economic and emotional tragedy for its family,69
and that, in all probability, the child would eventually become a
ward of the state. Nevertheless, most statutes still require that the
potential defect be incurable. The Model Penal Code, recognizing
the need for abortion in this instance, requires only that the antici-
pated disability must be grave, yet not irremediable.7
A final advancement proposed by the Model Penal Code, but
not yet adopted by any state, would leave each state free to specify
places other than a hospital where the abortion may be performed.7'
Most states, endeavoring to oversee and to protect the procedures and
frequency of abortions, condition the legality of the operation upon
its performance in an accredited hospital, except in emergencies.
Because of the religious inhibitions of some hospitals, probable
64 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment 5, at 154-55 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
65 One study based upon norms derived from dassical genetic theory claims that the
normal incidence of mental retardation doubles in the offspring of incestuous in-breed-
ing. George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements for Reform, in ABOR-
TION AND THE LAW 1, 27 n.136 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
66 In traditional Jewish law, incest is a capital crime and the children born of an
incestuous union are permitted to marry only children from similar origins. The justi-
fication for a law that saddled the innocent with the sins of their parents was the belief
that it acted as a strong deterrent for like behavior. This also reflected the natural law
that the parents alone are responsible for their children's fate, both prior and subsequent
to their births. Jakobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, in ABORTION AND THE LAW
124, 140-41 (D. Smith ed. 1967). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment
5, at 155 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
67 L. ILADER, supra note 1, at 5.
6 8 See note 8 supra.
69 The prospect of the birth of a mentally or physically crippled child can pose a
serious threat to the mental health of the mother. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11,
Comment 4, at 154 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
70 Id. When eugenic indications may be an issue for recommending abortion, con-
siderations of whether and to what extent the defect is remediable, the risks of survival,
and the chances for success must be honestly met by both the parents and their physician.
For an extended discussion of eugenic factors and whether their presence should
prompt an abortion, see Quay, Justifiable Abortion - Medical and Legal Foundations,
49 GEO. L.J. 173, 236-41 (1960).
7 1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11(2)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
ABORTION REFORM
overcrowding, and possible inaccessibility, the drafters of the Model
Code recommended that states may authorize additional facilities,72
for hospital equipment is not necessary for most abortions."
A review of the Model Code reveals that while it eliminates
the choice between childbirth or maternal death, and reduces the
number of children born as a result of forcible rape or incest, or
born with serious defects from eugenic factors, it does not offer a
complete solution to the growing population crisis nor does it deter
many women from consulting unskilled, incompetent, and unli-
censed abortionists. In addition, it discloses two general defects.
One is that it fails to establish adequate guidelines by which a
physician may counsel a patient regarding an abortion. Vague de-
scriptive criteria such as "reputable, .... competent, .... skilled," etc., as
referring to a doctor who may legally perform a therapeutic abor-
tion, are of little aid in designating an appropriate physician to
handle another's case.74 The second flaw underlies the whole ap-
proach to abortion regulation and raises the question of whether
such procedural norms belong among the criminal laws in the first
place. Many current reform laws no longer reside in penal codes
but are instead nestled within health, safety, and sanitation codes.
There are at least two advantages to this: (1) It avoids jamming
the penal statutes with endless details, and (2) it expedites necessary
changes to the regulations through modern, informed medical chan-
nels.76 Since probably the largest faction advocating abortion re-
form is the medical profession, it would seem more appropriate to
formulate the legal justifications for abortions within the statutes
that currently regulate physicians and hospitals. Interpretation of
ambiguous terms can then be made within the context of civil pro-
visions affecting only the practice of medicine rather than within
the context of the penal system.76
b. The California Therapeutic Abortion Act.- There was a
lull of about 8 years between the drafting of the Model Penal Code
72Id., Comment 8, at 157.
73 It has been suggested that complex hospital equipment is needless since a skilled
physician can perform a safe abortion in his office in less than 30 minutes. Comment,
Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration of State
Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L REV. 730, 771-72 n.167 (1968). A new drug currently
under experimentation, which can induce abortions in women as much as 5 months
pregnant, with no side effects if used in early pregnancy, can be administered in less
than a minute in a doctor's office or clinic. Fort Myers (Fla.) News-Press, Jan. 28,
1970, at 10, col. 1.
74 George, supra note 65, at 30.
75 Id.
76Id. at 31.
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and its partial adoption by several state legislatures through the en-
actment of therapeutic abortion laws. Of all the modern thera-
peutic acts, the California Act of 19677 appears the most progres-
sive. It offers improvements upon the Model Penal Code and at
the same time it presents some unique defects. Substantively, the
Act requires that abortions be performed in accredited hospitals,
following approval by a panel of at least two physicians, and three
if the proposed abortion will occur after the 13th week of preg-
nancy.78 The panel must determine that each application involves
either a substantial risk of grave impairment of the mother's physi-
cal or mental health if the pregnancy is continued or that the preg-
nancy resulted from rape or incest. The Act also provides that no
abortions will be approved after the 20th week of pregnancy under
any circumstances.79 The procedural aspects of the Act outline the
course to follow with pregnancies caused by rape or incest, which
requires, in essence, that no approval for abortion will be granted
before the district attorney determines that there is sufficient cause
to believe the alleged crime occurred.8"
In spite of its apparent progressive approach to the problems of
abortion, the California Act has several inherent shortcomings. Fol-
lowing the example of the Model Penal Code, the California Act
also expands the "necessary to preserve life" phrase to encompass
substantial risk to physical or mental health. However, by requiring
mental illness to be severe enough that the woman qualifies for
judicial commitment to a mental institution,8 the Act fails to rec-
ognize that there are other very real forms of mental illness which
can severely incapacitate the mother, and which may affect the child
as well, but which do not warrant institutionalization.8 -  While
77 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25951-54 (West Supp. 1969).
781d. §§ 25951(a)-(b), 25953. When there are no more than three physicians on
the panel, approval requires unanimous consent. Id.
7 Id. §§ 25951(c), 25953.
80 Upon receipt of an application for an abortion because of rape or incest, the com-
mittee must immediately notify the district attorney of the county where the alleged
incident occurred and send him the applicant's affidavit of the facts. Only if the dis-
trict attorney finds probable cause that the pregnancy resulted from the incident, or if no
reply is received within 5 days, may the committee approve the application. Id. §
25952(a). If the district attorney concludes that there is no probable cause, the appli-
cant may petition the superior court of the county where the alleged violation occurred
for a finding of probable cause, to be held within 1 week after filing. Id. § 25952(b).
81The Act defines impaired mental health as "mental illness to the extent that the
woman is dangerous to herself or to the person or property of others or is in need of
supervision or restraint." Id. § 2594.
82 For a discussion of other mental indices used as grounds for abortion in other
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legislative proponents have suggested that qualifying mental health
is necessary to discourage fraudulent claims, to require the woman
to be sufficiently psychotic to necessitate institutionalization as a
prerequisite to abortion does little to enhance the statute's alleged
leniency and flexibility.8 Fortunately, no such limitation was placed
upon the Act's allowance for impairment to physical health short of
pending death.
Although California expands the legal indications for abortion
to include rape and incest, a limitation of this reason for abortion to
girls under 1584 totally nullifies its avowed functions. If the ra-
tionale for authorizing abortion in such cases is to alleviate the inci-
dence of illegitimate and unwanted children, to prevent the genetic
consequences of close in-breeding, and to avert a permanent re-
minder of an emotionally traumatic offense against an innocent
victim, then logic demands the same consideration be given to older
females as well.8 5
While California's strict limitation of abortions to the first 20
weeks of pregnancy may reflect the fact that abortions become in-
creasingly hazardous after 20 weeks, it fails to acknowledge that a
woman's health may later be threatened so as to justify an abortion
at any time during the course of the pregnancy. 6 Several other
states, however, permit emergency abortion at any time during a
pregnancy provided a physician concludes that the threat of compli-
cations from continuing the pregnancy outweigh the potential dan-
gers of abortions.8 These statutes seem to adopt the conclusion of
recent studies that medical progress has diminished the danger of
late pregnancy abortion.88
states, see Rosen, supra note 61, at 82-87. For a discussion of the mental and emotional
impact of pregnancy on women, see E. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 15-17.
83Note, supra note 8, at 246.
84 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25952(c) (West Supp. 1969).
85 Although the emotional repercussions from such an act might be less, the social
problems raised would certainly not be reduced. Moreover, if the woman were married,
her husband would be legally committed to provide support for the child until 21,
since it is legally presumed that a child born in wedlock is the legitimate child of the
husband. See C. McCORMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 309, at 646(1954). If the woman is single, divorced, or widowed, the child cannot be legitimized
nor easily adopted. L LADER, supra note 1, at 155-60.
86 Comment, supra note 61, at 358-59.
87 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (iii) (West Supp. 1967)
(requires abortion in rape cases to occur within the first 16 weeks but mentions nothing
about time restrictions on other indications); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (West Supp.
1967) (permits abortions after the 12th week only in emergencies).
88Rosen, supra note 61, at 96.
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III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO LEGISLATION
Traditionally, judicial response to changing mores and commu-
nity standards has been slow. Laboring against such a brake, the
proabortion movement was unsuccessful in its early attacks on the
statutes. But as the trend toward liberal interpretation of the Con-
stitution has gathered momentum, protagonists of abortion reform,
riding on a wave of public sentiment, have met with increasing
success in the courts.
A. The Traditional judicial Approach
The first judicially-monitored attacks on the abortion laws were
not centered around the religious arguments or the practicalities of
enforcement, but rather focused on the constitutional issue of vague-
ness. 9 When legislation impinges upon personal freedom and
provides for punitive sanctions, then "precision of regulation must
be the touchstone."90  However, these early attacks met with little
success. Historically, the courts used two basic methods to uphold
state abortion statutes against charges of vagueness. One approach
was through reliance on the dictionary and the second was to find
support for the challenged law in its legislative history.
Typical of the first approach was People v. Rankin," a 1937
California case wherein the defendant alleged that the statutory
phrase, "procure the miscarriage of such woman"92 failed to inform
him "with reasonable certainty" of the act it prohibited. In reject-
ing defendant's contentions, the court cited two law dictionaries'
definitions of the procurement of miscarriage as "the criminal act
of destroying the foetus at any time before birth is termed, '9 3 and
89 It is well established that:
No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes.... [A] statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the
first essential of due process of law. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939).
90 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963).
91 10 Cal. 2d 198, 74 P.2d 71 (1937).
92 CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1967) provides:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman, or procures
any woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses or employs any
instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the mis-
carriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, is
punishable by imprisonment... not less than two nor more than five years.
93 10 Cal. 2d at 202, 74 P.2d at 73, quoting Bouvier's Law Dictionary and the
Cyclopedic Law Dictionary.
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concluded that the statute's phrase "was sufficiently explicit to in-
form persons of common intelligence and understanding of the acts
which were prohibited."9 4  In the 1946 Nebraska case of Hans v.
State, 5 the defendant alleged that since the statute's title, "Homi-
cide and Foeticide,"", did not refer to the killing of a vitalized
embryo, convicting him under that statute violated the state's con-
stitutional mandate that no bill could contain more than one sub-
ject as dearly expressed in the title.97 Although conceding that the
medical definitions of embryo and fetus differed, the court rec-
ognized only the legal definitions of a fetus as "an unborn child" '
and of foeticide as "destruction of the fetus, the act by which crimi-
nal abortion is produced."99 Thus, the court found that the defend-
ant dearly fell within the proscriptions of the statute.
Most courts, however, met the vagueness argument by reference
to the legislative intent and history of the statute in question. One
Florida court rejected the argument that the word "unlawfully,"
in referring to unlawfully using any instrument with intent to pro-
cure a miscarriage, could not be adequately defined to avoid ambi-
guity.100 In consulting the statute's legislative history, the court
noted that it was originally part of another act wherein the legisla-
The court added that each of the modern dictionaries of the English language gave
essentially the same definition. Id.
941d.
95 147 Neb. 67, 22 N.W.2d 385, vacated on other grounds, 147 Neb. 730, 25
N.W.2d 35 (1946).
96 The statute provided:
"Chapter II. - Homicide and Foetidde
Sec. 6 Any physician, or other person, who shall administer, or advise to be
administered, to any pregnant woman with a vitalized embryo, or foetus, at any
state of urero gestation, any... substance whatever, or who shall use... or
devise to be used . .'. any instrument or other means with intent thereby to de-
stroy such vitalized embryo, or foetus, unless the same shall have been neces-
sary to preserve the life of the mother, or shall have been advised by two physi-
cians to be necessary for such purpose, shall, in case of the death of such
vitalized embryo, or foetus, or mother, in consequence thereof, be imprisoned
. .. not less than one nor more than ten years." Quoted in Hans v. State, 147
Neb. 67, 70, 22 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1946).
97 Artide II, section 19, of the constitution provided: "'No bill shall contain more
than one subject, and the same shall be dearly expressed in the title."' Quoted in Hans
v. State, 147 Neb. 67,70,22 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1946).
98 
"An infant in ventre sa mere." BLAcK's LAW DIcnroNARY 794 (3d ed. 1933).
99 Id. at 769.
100 In Carter v. State, 155 So. 2d 787 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 376 U.S. 648 (1963),
the court found that the challenged part of the statute, "Whoever with intent to pro-
cure miscarriage of any woman. ., unlawfully uses any instrument or other means
whatever with the like intent... ." EFLA. STAT. ANN. § 797.01 (1965)J, was not on
its face vague.
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ture defined abortion as unlawful unless necessary to preserve the
mother's life, and advised as such by two physicians." 1 In Kudish v.
Board of Registration in Medicine,10 2 a Massachusetts court held that
any uncertainty in the statutory phrase "unlawfully procuring mis-
carriage" was clarified by prior judicial decisions permitting physi-
cians to perform abortions in good faith and with an honest belief
that the mother's life or health was in danger.'0 3
It is arguable that by resorting to extra-judicial matter, i.e., lexi-
cons and legislative history, to prove the statutes' clarity, these courts
confirmed instead its antithesis. Such decisions myopically ignored
the judicial principle that, at least where criminal laws are involved,
reasonable men should be expected to understand the laws by reli-
ance upon the plain meaning rule alone. Moreover, by such an
approach the courts avoided the more cogent argument that present
societal conditions no longer reflect the same needs that inspired
the original enactment of these laws. 04 A review of the traditional
judicial attitude, then, evinces a judicial reluctance to do little more
than follow a strict, narrow approach to the problem.
B. The Belous Approach
In 1969, the California Supreme Court presaged the destiny of
such narrow interpretations of abortion regulations. People v. Be-
lous'05 reversed a doctor's conviction for abortion in violation of
section 274 of the California Penal Code - the predecessor of the
California Therapeutic Abortion Act - which permitted abortions
only when necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman,'0 "
and held that the statute offended constitutional safeguards against
unreasonably vague and overbroad legislation.'
101 155 So. 2d at 788-89.
102 248 N.E.2d 264 (Mass. 1969).
10 Id. at 266.
104 One of the oldest principles of the common law is that once the reason for a
law is no longer valid, the law itself is no longer valid. People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 362, 458 P.2d 194, 202 (1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1970); Galyon v. Municipal Court, 229 Cal. App. 2d 667, 671-72, 40 Cal. Rptr. 446,
449 (1964).
105 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 1970).
106 For the text of section 274, see note 92 supra.
107 A criminal statute may be void if it "either on its face or as authoritatively con-
strued, while reaching conduct that may lawfully be punished, is nevertheless so broad
in its sweep that it may be used to punish constitutionally protected conduct." P.
KAUPER, CONSTITUTONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 856, at explanatory note 4
(3d ed. 1966). See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversing a
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The defendant, Dr. Leon Belous, a licensed physician and sur-
geon specializing in obstetrics and gynecology, was approached in
1966 by an unmarried couple who beseeched him to perform an
abortion, insisting that they would seek the operation in Tijuana if
he refused. Although Dr. Belous was intimately familiar with the
hazards of Tijuana abortions, he had personally witnessed compe-
tent abortions performed by a Dr. Lairtus. Lairtus was licensed to
practice medicine only in Mexico but was, at this time, living in
California where he was seeking a license and actively performing
abortions. Convinced that the girl's life would actually be in dan-
ger if she went to Tijuana, Dr. Belous gave the couple Lairtus' phone
number. Subsequent to a police search of Lairtus' records, Dr.
Belous was convicted and fined $5,000 with 2 years probation.
In reversing Dr. Belous' conviction, the California Supreme
Court ruled that section 274, specifically the phrase "necessary to
preserve," was vague and overbroad and thus unconstitutionally in-
terfered with personal liberties. The court reasoned that the stat-
utory languaget was so pervaded with uncertainty that those subject
to criminal sanctions were forced to speculate as to its meaning.
Moreover, the court held that the broad scope of the statute could
not be narrowly construed so as to protect the physician's funda-
mental liberties guaranteed by the 14th amendment and, simultane-
ously, preserve the original legislative intent. Therefore, the stat-
ute was invalidated entirely.
The California court's approach was really threefold. After re-
jecting the Rankin and Hans dictionary approach, the Belous court
sought to apply four suggested interpretations of the "necessary to
preserve" standard which had been derived from past judicial hold-
ings, in hopes of illuminating the propriety of abortion in any par-
ticular situation. After examining the alternatives, the court rejected
all four interpretive standards requiring (1) certainty of death, (2)
reasonable certainty of death, (3) possibility of death, and (4) rel-
ative danger of death. Next, the court weighed the detrimental ef-
fects of the statute upon both the physician compelled to make the
abortion decision and the woman requesting such an operation.
Third, the court intimated that although revision of the statutory
language might avoid the vagueness problem, there remained the
conviction for breach of the peace, the offense being so generalized as to be "not sus-
ceptible of exact definition"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (applying the
clear and present danger test to a picketing statute, the Court found that picketing would
cause no such serious and imminent danger to life, property, or privacy as to justify the
broad sweep of the statute).
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additional issue lurking behind all abortion legislation - whether
such legislation contravenes both the marital right to privacy and
the woman's right to decide whether to bear children."0 8
The Belous court, in rejecting all four suggested standards, rea-
soned that the interpretations were vague, no longer appropriate in
light of changing surgical techniques, tended to foster criminal abor-
tions,10 9 and effectively destroyed or were not in line with original
legislative intent. 10 Furthermore, when balanced against a woman's
fundamental rights to live and to choose whether to bear children,
the states could show no overriding interest" - especially in light
of the priority that has been accorded in all 51 jurisdictions to the
mother's life over that of the unborn child." 2 The Belous court, in
108 Although vague statutes might be made clear, a second question was left unan-
swered: "[W7rhere, if at all, the legislature may draw its line [in clearly contravening
asserted fundamental liberties]." Comment, supra note 73, at 769.
109The Belous court stated that criminal abortion was "the most common single
cause of maternal death in California." 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363, 458 P.2d at 201, quoting
Fox, Abortion Deaths in California, 98 AM. J. OBsT. & GYNEC 645, 650 (1967).
In 1961, New York City recorded that 47 percent of its maternal deaths were caused
by illegal abortions. Niswander, supra note 8, at 37. Even conceding that contracep-
tion is preferable to abortion, no matter how effective and easily obtainable contracep-
tion may be, unwanted pregnancies will inevitably occur and abortions will be sought.
Hall, supra note 1, at 234. If abortion were legalized for a broad spectrum of reasons,
women could rely on it to complement normal contraceptive measures, and the criminal
abortionist would, in all probability, be driven out of business.
110 Although the legislative intent in 1850 might have been that every fetus should
be carried to term in order to protect the mother against the extreme dangers of surgical
treatment, the Belous court indicated that such a purpose is not valid today when hospi-
tal abortions within the first trimester of pregnancy are less dangerous than carrying
the child to term. 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61,458 P.2d at 200-01.
Additionally, the court concluded that if the "necessary to preserve" standard were
interpreted to include psychological factors the legislative intent would be destroyed,
since by the mere threat of suicide any woman could obtain a legal abortion. See, e.g.,
People v. Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1965) (reversing the con-
viction of a physician who had performed an abortion in reliance on letters from two
psychiatrists attesting that the abortion was necessary to save the patient from the
"possibility" of suicide).
111 Appellant (Belous) conceded that the State had an interest in insuring that only
licensed physicians perform abortions, only under aseptic conditions, and not when the
fetus has already developed to the stage of viability. But, the statute's defect lay in its
overbreadth which, instead of specifically legislating its direct interests, forbade all abor-
tions regardless of the physician's judgment of the possibility of harmful results from
such inaction. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458
P.2d 194 (1969) (which also argues that the state medical licensing and procedure laws
already satisfy the state's interests in these matters. Id. at 8 n.13). "Where there is a
significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon show-
ing a subordinating interest which is compelling." Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 (1960). The Belous court determined that the woman's constitutional right to life
is at stake because childbirth does carry some risk of death. It also assumed that she
has a fundamental right to choose whether to bear children, as analogous to rights such
as marital and sexual privacy that have been acknowledged both by that court and the
Supreme Court. 80 Cal Rptr. at 359, 458 P.2d at 199.
112 80 Cal. Rptr., at 363, 458 P.2d at 203. See E. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 53; Leavy
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effect, considered and dismissed all of the justifications relied upon
by past courts to uphold abortion laws challenged as vague. More-
over, the court found that this incurable inherent vagueness had two
invidious consequences - both the patient and the physician were
denied due process of law. The court concluded that the imprecise
statute forced the physician, be he intrepid or not, to guess at the
statute's meaning, with the attendant criminal punishment for mak-
ing an incorrect guess. There can be little doubt that a physician
who faces revocation of his license, a fine, and felony conviction
cannot impartially weigh circumstances that might favor an abor-
tion."' Such pressure, the court felt, may understandably induce
the physician to decide against abortion for he would not run the
risk of prosecution if the woman should die because a necessary
abortion was not performed. Placing the doctor in this unenviable
position, not only denied his right to due process, but it also affected
the patient's constitutional rights.
Skewing the penalties only in the direction of the physician ef-
fectively denied the woman her fundamental right to live, since it
undermined the physician's right to act in good faith, to the best of
his ability and judgment for the benefit of his patient.11 4  More-
over, the court found a more tangible intrusion of the patient's
rights - a statute which delegates decisionmaking power to a
& Kummer, sapra note 25, at 662. For a discussion of the Jewish and Protestant views
on the priority of the mother's life, see L. LADER, supra note 1, at 97-102.
It is noted that emphasis normally is not placed on the legal rights of the fetus until
the later stages of pregnancy. As one example, for the purpose of California's man-
slaughter/murder statutes, a fetus is considered a human being only when "it is capable
of living an independent life as a separate being, and where in the natural course of
events it will so live if given normal and reasonable care." People v. Chavez, 77 Cal.
App. 2d 621, 626, 176 P.2d 92, 94 (1947). See Keeler v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr.
865 (Ct. App. 1969), where killing a 31- to 36-week old fetus was considered man-
slaughter since the fetus was viable and weighed 5 pounds. Some states do not have such
a law, and instead require that the child be born alive first and then die before an at-
tacker can be charged with manslaughter. See, e.g., Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So.
671 (1898).
13 See E. ScHUR, supra note 1, at 2 7-28. For many physicians, the desire to exer-
cise the best care possible for their patients, which may include performing abortions
when indicated, is matched by their fear of detection and prosecution. The inevitable
confusion emerging from this dilemma surely must have some detrimental effect on the
physicians' professional or private lives. For other physicians, perhaps, tempted by
financial benefits that overshadow their more conservative brothers' fears of discovery,
revocation of a license may be an empty gesture. An abortionist's reputation rests
upon his skill, not his collection of framed diplomas. Id. at 38.
114 The court noted that because section 274 requires the physician to determine at
his peril the necessity for an abortion, the "woman whose life is at stake may be as ef-
fectively condemned to death as if the law flatly prohibited all abortions." 80 Cal. Rptr.
at 336, 458 P.2d at 206.
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financially interested party may well be contrary to the due process
clause of the 14th amendment.11
In light of the breadth of the Belous court's analysis, one may
conclude that it would invalidate all existing state legislation on
abortion, including the Model Code and the progressive therapeutic
acts. Because of the vagueness of existing standards, any judicial
effort to provide physicians with sufficiently definitive criteria to
enable them to formulate proper decisions would effectively defeat
the legislative intent of these statutes. Furthermore, the court's
position on fundamental rights and lack of sufficient state interest
may well portend the deracination of all such legislation.
IV. POST Belous PROJECTION
Examination of the current and proposed legislation suggests
that vagueness may not be the only flaw uncovered by Belous.
The court's finding that section 274 of the California Code was un-
constitutionally vague is only one of three possible routes that may
be taken by future courts. The vagueness approach has merit in
that it is not necessary for a court to assume the entire burden of
resolving an important and complex religious, moral, and politically
sensitive constitutional question. By finding section 274 vague and
by limiting analysis to presently used interpretations, the court has
laid the problem squarely in the lap of the state legislature - and
perhaps with the legislature's greater capacity to determine facts and
public sentiment this is proper. With the only judicial guidance
available that certain phrases are improper, the legislature will be
hard pressed to find suitable language and may be forced to consider
seriously whether the whole approach to abortion is appropriate.
Of more far-reaching consequence are the other two approaches
suggested by Belous. The first is the relative safety test which ap-
pears to have been recognized by some modern therapeutic acts,
and is premised upon the belief that the state does have a limited
interest in controlling abortions. A second approach would rec-
ognize that the state has no compelling interest in abortion - at
least until the fetus is viable. In view of the Be/ous court's assump-
tion (not holding) that a woman has a fundamental right to de-
cide whether to bear children,116 adopting this approach would seem
115 Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), where the Court found that the de-
fendant was denied due process since the magistrate's salary was dependent upon a per-
centage of the fine assessed against Tumey.
116 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60, 458 P.2d at 199-200.
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to require an analysis of whether, under principles of due process,
such a right exists in fact and, if so, whether it may be limited by a
compelling state interest.117
Presently the first of these two approaches suggests that the
state interest rests on the well-being of the mother," 8 and would
make abortion legal when it is safer than childbirth, or unlawful
where abortion is more dangerous. One problem, however, with
this test is that although the approach may be on a relative danger
continuum, the decision is still not placed in the hands of the wo-
man, but rather rests with a panel of physicians.- 9 Moreover,
117 It is interesting to note that the issue of constitutional due process is not men-
tioned in the Model Code [see MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comments (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959)] in relation to any supposed rights the unborn child would have in pro-
hibiting an abortion. See Sands, supra note 2, at 304-06, wherein the author examines
this question and concludes that the weight of authority agree that the therapeutic abor-
tion acts do not raise a constitutional question regarding the unborn child. But, query,
whether such a question could be so easily dismissed for the mother?
The Belous court expressed doubt as to whether the state's interest could ever justify
requiring a woman to risk death, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363, 458 P.2d at 203, and certainly
"childbirth involves risks of death." Id. at 359, 458 P.2d at 199 (footnote omitted).
This risk of death, in any degree, may actually be the basis for finding a fundamental
right to choose whether to bear children, although the court appeared to rely on the
source of such right as stemming from the right to privacy in matters related to mar-
riage, family, and sex. See id.
118 Cf. 80 Cal. Rptr. at 365, 458 P.2d at 205, wherein the court stated: "There is
nothing to indicate that in adopting the Therapeutic Abortion Act the Legislature was
asserting an interest in the embryo."
119 There is never any guarantee that the panel will be free from personal bias, even
where records of meetings and deliberations are maintained. Religious opposition to
abortion may well manifest itself in the decisionmaking process of individual panel
members and would be nearly impossible to prevent. The chief of obstetrics at one
large east coast county hospital openly boasted that no abortion had been performed
there in 20 years! L. LADER, supra note 1, at 25.
Even without the problem of bias, panel decisions could vary with the hospital,
depending on such factors as unavailability of hospital space at the time of application,
varying standards, and variable professional judgment as to the necessity for the re-
quested abortion - leaving the woman at the mercy of chance.
Increasing pressure from political and religious groups and pressing financial con-
siderations may cause public hospitals to institute quota systems within which the panel
must work. That such systems would gravely impair the opportunities for abortion
among the lower socio-economic strata is evident, those of means would simply go to
the private hospital when the public hospital quota was filled, whereas the indigent
and poor would undoubtedly be foreclosed from such a choice. Such an arbitrary sys-
tem would be the foundation for a strong equal protection argument For a discussion
and criticism of quota systems, see L. LADER, supra note 1, at 27-31. On hospital com-
mittee reviews of applications for abortion as constituting state action, and their dis-
criminatory effect on the poor, see Comment, supra note 73, at 769-72. On economic
discrimination, see United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969); L. LADER,
supra note 1, at 29, 65-66; Greenhouse, supra note 4, at 88; Comment, supra note 73,
at 772-73 & n.175; Note, supra note 8, at 246-47.
One author suggests that the ideal abortion panel should include a physician, ob-
stetrician, psychiatrist, social worker, housewife, lawyer, and a representative of the
general public, and that provision should be made for judicial review of the panel's de-
cisions. Kutner, supra note 23, at 25.
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given present medical and surgical advances, danger to the mother
during early term abortions is minimal in relation to possible danger
to her mental and physical health from an unwanted pregnancy, and,
thus, such a state interest would not appear to be sufficiently com-
pelling to limit her fundamental right to control childbearing.
Recently the federal district court in Washington, D.C., in United
States v. Vuitch,12 ° expanded this relative danger approach by imply-
ing that a woman's right to an abortion should exist even when her
life and health are not in danger. Rejecting the District of Colum-
bia's abortion statute as vague, the federal court left to the legisla-
ture the revision of the statute in light of current conditions of
medicine, sociology, and constitutional interpretation.121
In response to the suggested approach that the state has no com-
pelling interest in regulating abortion, one state legislature has im-
plicitly adopted this view by enacting an abortion statute which,
for the most part, gives the woman full discretion to determine
whether to abort the pregnancy. In March, 1970, the Hawaiian leg-
islature passed a measure which allows any woman over 20 years of
age to have an abortion "for the asking," if performed by a licensed
physician in a government licensed hospital, provided the fetus is not
yet viable. The state is the first to treat abortion as an exclusive
decision of the pregnant woman in consultation with her physician. 2
Notwithstanding Hawaii's acceptance of this approach, whether
women have a constitutional right to plan their families in any
chosen manner and whether the fruits of their sexual relations are no
concern of the state are questions which remain unanswered by the
courts. 2 ' It is arguable that such a right is found in the right to
privacy and the position espoused in Griswold v. Connecticut,'24
which vacated Connecticut's anti-birth-control statute. In that case
the marital right to privacy was grounded on the Supreme Court's
interpretation of penumbral rights inherent within the fourth, fifth,
and ninth amendments as applied to the states through the 14th
120 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
121 Id. at 1035-36.
122 TIME, Mar. 9, 1970, at 34.
1231t has been forcefully argued: "'It is a man and woman who must decide whether
or not they wish their union to lead to the birth of a child, not the church ... and cer-
tainly not the state."' L LADER, supra note 1, at 99, quoting Rabbi Israel Margolies.
124 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statute pro-
scribing interracial marriage held violative of due process); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (involuntary sterilization law infringed upon basic liberties of mar-
riage and procreation).
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amendment.' 25 The Griswold consensus, in essence, would retain
through the ninth amendment those fundamental rights not enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights. 126  It would seem reasonable to infer
that abortion may belong in this category. Prior to the enactment
of the Bill of Rights, and before 1827, American common law per-
mitted abortions before quickening. It is arguable that the right to
an abortion, although not expressly enumerated in the Constitution,
was a part of the American tradition, and, therefore, falls within
the purview of the Constitution in the same manner as marital
privacy. Moreover, as has been frequently argued, the issues raised
in Griswold concerning contraception are so similar to those reflected
by abortion that abortion must likewise be safeguarded from trans-
gression by the state. 27 A comparison of the Connecticut anti-con-
traception statute with current abortion laws demonstrates that:
(1) Both countervail presently acknowledged medical standards;
(2) both tresspass upon the marital bedroom by subverting the
discretion of married couples to unerringly plan the timing and size
of their families; (3) both oblige the option of bearing possibly
imperfect children or practicing abstinence; and (4) although both
are generally unenforced, impending prosecution persistently threat-
ens.128  Admittedly, a limited expansion of Griswold would be re-
quired to fit it into the abortion reform mold. Conceptually, how-
ever, an early abortion is but a degree removed from contraception,
the only substantial difference being that abortion occurs after the
egg and the sperm have already united. What is more, even this
distinction is minimized in view of the fact that no known attempt
has been made to challenge the legality of the use of some contra-
ceptives which are, in effect, abortifacients. 29
125 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a thorough analysis of Griswold, see Emerson,
Nine Justices in Search of a Doctine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1965).
126 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.
127 Comment, supra note 73, at 776.
128 Additionally, both laws exacerbate the world's most exigent crisis - overpopula-
tion - and both sanction government imposition of one religious and ethical ideal
upon peoples of disparate and essentially incompatible persuasions. Leavy & Kummer,
supra note 25, at 674. Chief Judge Weintraub, dissenting in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
49 N.J. 22, 55, 227 A.2d 689, 707 (1967), pointed out that whereas the evil prohibited
by most penal codes is easily perceptible, in abortion and contraception even the exist-
ence of evil depends entirely upon individual religious convictions. Acknowledging the
diverse views regarding the point at which the unborn entity has established a claim
to human life sufficient to supplant its mother's autonomy over her own welfare, he
found it not surprising that the legislators could agree only upon amorphous legal
phraseology. Id. at 59-63,227 A.2d at 709-11.
29 These devices prevent attachment of the fertilized egg to the uterine wall,
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When attempting, then, to balance the substantial interest the
mother may have in bearing children only when she wants them
and the interests the state may claim in tagging the developing germ
cells as "human" the moment they meet, Griswold promises to be a
plausible vehicle for rescinding abortion ordinances.130  The most
serious drawback to this approach, however, is that Griswold would
affect only married couples, while abortions are being sought in-
creasingly by unwed mothers, for whom the consequences of a preg-
nancy may be far more severe. 1 '1 Opponents of this approach to
abortion would agree: "We are no longer in the sacred precincts of
the marital bedroom. The act is complete, the doors are open, and
the zone of privacy is no more.'132
Although Griswold may suggest that the decision whether to
bear a child is an elementary, personal freedom derived from implicit
constitutional values, not to be abbreviated by local legislation, cau-
tion must be advised to insure that, with abortion, the court will en-
deavor to expand the ninth amendment and the concept of penum-
bral rights in a manner not limited solely to activities transpiring
within a marital relationship.
which normally occurs within 6-7 days following conception. Kutner, supra note 23, at
4; Comment, supra note 73, at 760-61; 46 ORE. L. REV. 211-12 (1967). Early surgical
abortions similarly would sever the potential fetus from its source of nutrition, at nearly
the same stage of development as with the oral abortifacients. See Comment, supra
note 73, at 763.
The Model Code, however, maintains such a distinction by indicating that the pro-
visions applicable to abortion do not include "the prescription, administration, or dis-
tribution of drugs or other substances for avoiding pregnancy, whether by preventing
implantation of a fertilized ovum or by any other method that operates before, at, or
immediately after fertilization." MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11(7) (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1959). It is interesting to note that this clause was drafted several years before oral
contraception was in wide use and well before discovery of and experimentation with the
abortifacient-type contraceptives.
The criticial problem is determining at what point does one cease characterizing the
use of these devices as contraception and commence identifying it as abortion. Although
beyond the scope of this Note, many problems are raised by use of abortifacients. Stat-
utes vary in their application, depending on the stage of pregnancy: whether applica-
tion begins at the time of conception or after implantation could be critical. Addi-
tionally, where pregnancy is made an element of the crime, an attempted prosecution for
use of abortifacients would face a formidable obstacle - lack of evidence. However,
where pregnancy is not an element, a successful prosecution might be mounted. For
an expanded discussion of the legal implications of the use of abortifacients, see Kutner,
supra note 23, at 4-6; 46 ORE. L. REV. 211 (1967).
130 Comment, supra note 73, at 764.
131 One survey tallied a 24 percent increase in the number of children born out of
wedlock between 1960 and 1964. Interestingly, the greatest rise in illegitimacy did
not occur among teenagers and young adults, as one might assume, but in those be-
tween the ages of 25 and 34. L. LADER, supra note 1, at 59-60.
132 Greenhouse, supra note 4, at 90, quoting New York Assistant Attorney General,
Joel Lewittes, who will handle the state's defense when four presently pending New
York cases are heard.
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V. CONCLUSION
Today, as never before, the population explosion is an omnipres-
ent threat to our national prosperity.13 3 The social and fiscal conse-
quences of too many people, especially too many in the ghetto or in
other impoverished areas of the country, staggers the imagination.'34
Antiquated laws prohibiting abortion, purportedly concerned with
morality and the rights of embryos, are fostering an immoral conges-
tion of humanity - often unwanted, frequently neglected, and al-
ways in need of aid that invariably is inadequate or late in arrival.3 5
The prehensile tail of early abortion law is wrapped around the
moral issues of the scarlet woman and religious dogma, and cannot,
at the same time, lay hold of the obvious immorality involved in
antiabortion byproducts such as growth of ghettos, burgeoning crime
rates, and overflowing homes for unwanted children."3"
The courts alone will not be able to resolve the problems. Al-
though the Belous court commendably recognized constitutional is-
sues of vagueness and the fundamental rights of women, other vital
social and economic aspects of the question of abortion were not di-
rectly called to the attention of those who were in a position to do
something about it - namely, the state legislature. It took the
Vuitch court, in leaving the District of Columbia without any abor-
tion law, to directly call upon its legislature to examine and restruc-
133 For a recent commentary on this problem, see P. EiRICH, THE POPULATION
BOMB (1969).
134 It took India (whose land area is about two-fifths the size of continental United
States) from the beginning of its existence until 1966 to reach a population of about
480 million, and yet it is estimated that at its present rate of growth that figure will
double in 35 years! L. LADER, supra note 1, at 136. Although the United States is not
in as precarious a position, we too are facing many social problems never before experi-
enced in the same magnitude - housing shortages, urban expansion, and transporta-
tion inadequacies are just a few examples which are related to a rapidly growing popula-
tion.
135 For too long our only concern has been with the rights of the embryo and
the endless creation of rivers of humanity. Now, in our revolt against servi-
tude to uncontrolled fertility, and a reckless flood of children born as acci-
dents and out of ignorance, we at last have recognized that survival of the
embryo is not enough. Our laws must not demand that conceptions be brought
to term without being equally concerned about the child who is born. As
crucial as his right to be born is his welfare as a human being. L. LADinE,
supra note 1, at 155.
136 "Our welfare agencies, our foster homes, the whole vast machinery of public
and private institutions dedicated to child care have been involved almost
wholly with picking up the pieces. Instead, we should attack the root of the
problem-the needs and rights of the child to be born with a fair chance
for social as well as physical development Our responsibility is to guarantee
that no child comes into this world unwanted, unloved and uncared for." Id.,
quoting Sophia M. Robison, Professor-Emeritus of Columbia University's
School of Social Work.
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ture the relevant abortion laws after first reviewing all medical, so-
cial, and constitutional problems presented. This court, in essence,
returned the congressional buck which heretofore had meant pro-
viding a statute that was "just an incomplete act of legislation
whereby the Legislature passed to the judiciary for gestation the
touchy subject of contraception."' 37
These constitutional and social problems must be taken into ac-
count in formulating meaningful new abortion controls, and the con-
trols may well vary for the period of pregnancy. It is probable that
a state could muster sufficient interest in the unborn child during its
period of viability, i.e., for such purposes as murder/manslaughter
laws, or for testate and intestate succession. On the other hand, in
light of medical advances and the holdings of Belous and Vuitch,
there may no longer be sufficient state interest in controlling abor-
tions during the first trimester of pregnancy (aside from insuring
abortion is conducted by competent physicians). It would appear,
then, that the legislative focus should center on that period before
viability and after the first trimester - a period of 7 to 10 weeks
when abortion presents a medical risk greater than childbirth and a
legal risk less than that of manslaughter or murder.
KATHRYN G. MILMAN
137 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 59, 227 A.2d 689, 709 (1967) (Weintraub,
C.J., dissenting in part).
